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I. Introduction 
Objectives of the study 
The aim of this study is to improve our understanding of the nature, size and 
role of the informal financial sector in Malawi. More specifically, the study 
pursues the following interrelated objectives: 
1. To determine the origin and underlying reasons for the development of the 
informal financial sector side by side with the formal and semi-formal 
financial sector; 
2. To ascertain the behavioural traits of the participants in the informal 
financial sector in terms of the characteristics of savers, lenders and 
borrowers; the nature, terms and conditions of credit; and the purpose for 
which resources are saved or borrowed, etc.; and 
3. To ascertain the size of the informal financial sector, and, if possible, the size 
of individual sub-sectors within it, as well as future prospects for the 
informal financial sector. 
For the purpose of this study, the informal financial sector consists of those 
economic entities and their financial transactions which are not directly 
amenable to control by key monetary and financial policy instruments. The term 
"informal" is used here for lack of a better word.1 In no way does it imply that 
this sector operates without internal rules and established procedures. By its 
nature, the informal financial sector is heterogeneous, made up of all types of 
individuals and intermediaries. A convenient classification might be into (i) 
proprietary informal financial entities, such as money lenders (katapila), traders, 
estate owners, grain millers, smaliholder farmers, and other businessmen; (ii) 
mutual aid entities, such as savings and credit associations (SCAs), co-operative 
savings associations (CSAs) and community funds; and (iii) staff and social 
welfare schemes, such as those run by employers, friends, relatives and 
neighbours. The terms "proprietary" and "mutual aid" have been used before 
(Chandavarkar, 1985). 
Excluded from the definition of the informal financial sector are institutions 
whose establishment is the subject of statute law and whose operation is in one 
2 PAPER 4 
way or another subject to official regulation and control. These institutions, 
which constitute the formal financial sector, consist of a central bank, two 
commercial banks, a Post Office Savings Bank (POSB), a building society, eight 
insurance and assurance companies, two hire purchase and lease finance 
companies, and one development bank. Also excluded are a number of semi- 
formal financial institutions that are subject to nominal regulation and control 
even though their establishment may be subject to statute law. These are the 
credit unions that operate under the umbrella of the Malawi Union of Savings 
and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO), two small development finance 
companies that serve the small-scale and medium-scale business community, a 
smallholder agricultural credit fund and a newly established village banking 
institution catering for the needs of low-income rural households who have no 
alternative sources of credit. 
Hypotheses 
In pursuit of the objectives stated above, this study attempts to answer the 
following questions: 
1. Whether the informal financial sector plays a significant role in mobilizing 
financial resources in general, and in financial intermediation, i.e. in the 
mobilization and allocation of savings, in particular; 
2. Whether the informal financial sector plays a significant role in extending 
credit to priority sectors; 
3. Whether real rates of interest are higher in the informal financial sector than 
in the formal and semi-formal financial sector; 
4. Whether the informal financial sector complements the formal and semi- 
formal financial sector; 
5. Whether the informal financial sector is a significant source of income and 
employment; 
6. Whether the size of the informal financial sector is significantly larger than 
the size of the formal and semi-formal financial sector. 
Scope 
For almost all analytical purposes this study covers the entire country. For some 
purposes, however, it is divided into (i) the rural sector (smallholder sub-sector 
and estate sub-sector), and (ii) the urban sector. The former accounts for 89 
percent of the country's population, while the latter has the remaining 11 
percent. 
II. Background and justification 
The formal and semi-formal financial sector 
As in many other less developed countries, the formal and semi-formal banking 
system in Malawi is fragmented and repressed. All financial institutions except 
commercial banks, the POSB and credit unions exist only in urban areas. Most 
of them offer a narrow range of financial services. The commercial banks 
concentrate on providing working capital, mainly to large-scale business 
enterprises. The development banks rely on foreign resources more than 
domestic resource mobilization to finance their operation. In addition, the 
Investment and Development Fund (INDEFUND), the Small-scale Enterprise 
Development Organisation of Malawi (SEDOM) and MUSCCO, are the only 
organizations which lend money to small- and medium-scale enterprises (SMEs) 
in the fields of retail and wholesale trade, service industries (e.g. repair of shoes, 
radios, watches and motor vehicles, restaurants, rest houses and bars), and 
manufacturing activities (clothing manufacture, carpentry, food processing, 
sheet metal products, etc.) (Malawi/USAID, 1987). Neither do small- and 
medium-scale export enterprises and consumers receive much fmancial support. 
The estate agricultural sector obtains short-term (seasonal) finance from 
commercial banks. In the absence of a land bank, commercial banks were 
directed to provide medium-term loans to this sector for opening new estates in 
the mid-1970s. From March 1980 to July 1989, all credit for estate tobacco and 
maize was provided at subsidized interest rates. The Government extends credit, 
mainly seasonal, to the smaitholder agricultural sector, but the coverage of this 
credit scheme is limited to only 23 percent of smaliholder farmers (Malawi 
Government, 1988a). 
The insufficient delivery of loans to SMEs is partly due to the limited legal 
mandate that most of the formal financial institutions have and, with the 
exception of commercial banks and insurance companies at present, lack of 
adequate resources. Although the commercial banks and insurance companies 
have sufficient resources to lend to SMEs, they do not extend much credit to 
them because it is costly to deal with a large number of SME borrowers, SMEs 
are considered risky borrowers, and because historically and intentionally, their 
target group has excluded SMEs (Malawi/IJSAID, 1987). 
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The above shortcomings of the formal and semi-formal banking system are 
being felt more and more as SMEs involved in trading, service and 
manufacturing industries expand, and as the licensing of new SMEs to market 
and export primary products creates new demand for credit. According to a 
recent study (Malawi/USAID, 1987), SME investment in trading, service and 
manufacturing activities is projected to rise from MK16 million in 1987 to 
MK35 million in 1991. Internally generated funds and INDEFUND/SEDOM 
credit will not be able to fmance all the projected investment. The study projects 
a financing gap of MK1 million in 1989, rising to MK9 million in 1991. If we 
add the financing needs of the marketing and export SMEs to that figure, the 
gap becomes even larger. 
To address this problem, Malawi has partly relied on increasing the lending 
base of semi-formal financial institutions through donor finance, thus making 
this sector more dependent on uncertain foreign-aid flows. It has also relied 
partly on upward interest adjustments. Indeed, in order to increase financial 
savings, promote efficient allocation of bank credit and the extent of financial 
intermediation against the background of high rates of inflation (Tables 1, 2, and 
3), Malawi has adjusted short-term rates of interest fairly frequently since the 
mid-1970s and especially after 1979 (Table 4). 
Table 1 Consumer price index* and inflation rates 
(1980=100) 
Year Index Inflation rate 
1968 36.9 
1969 37.8 1.08 
1970 40.8 9.38 
1971 441 8.09 
1972 45.7 3.68 
1973 48.1 5.25 
1974 55.5 15.38 
1975 64.1 15.5 
1976 66.9 4.37 
1977 69.7 4.19 
1978 75.7 8.61 
1979 84 10.96 
1980 100 19.05 
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1986. 
* Consumer price index for Blantyre low-income group. 
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Table 2 Composite retail price index* 
Year Index Inflation rate 
1980 100.0 
1981 110.4 10.40 
1982 120.0 8.79 
1983 136.2 13.41 
1984 151.2 11.01 
1985 173.8 14.95 
1986 199.7 ' 14.90 
1987 252.9 26.70 
1988 332.2 31.50 
1989 N/A 15.70 
Source: National Statistical Office, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, July 1987. 
* Composite retail price index for the cities of Blantyre and Lilongwe only. 
Table 3 Changes in prices as measured by 
the GDP deflator 



























Source: IMF, International Rnancial Statistics 1986 and Malawi 
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All the interest-rate adjustments, except the ones which were carried out in 
August 1970 and April 1988, have been upwards. The strategy has implicitly 
assumed that what matters most in financial savings decisions is the interest rate 
or opportunity cost of consumption, which in turn determines willingness to 
save. The level of income which determines ability to save has only recently 
been given prominence in the strategy. The foreign capital inflows which may 
complement or compete with domestic savings are not given consideration. 
Expected inflation, as a proxy for future price expectations, is now receiving due 
attention, but not returns on physical capital goods or institutional factors. 
The upward adjustments in short-term interest rates reached their peak in July 
1987, when, for example, the prime overdraft rate was raised to 20 percent, the 
savings deposit rate to 13.75 percent, the interest rate on long-term deposits to 
17.25 percent, and the bank rate to 14 percent per annum (Table 4). This 
exercise was accompanied by a measure that gave commercial banks a say in the 
setting of the prime overdraft rate. These high rates of interest discouraged 
borrowing and raised the cost of funds to all financial institutions. Consequently, 
they were reduced by three percentage points in April 1988 (Table 4). This 
adjustment was accompanied by a measure that gave non-bank financial 
institutions some power to determine their own deposit rates. Potentially, this 
gives non-banks the opportunity to raise deposit rates above their level at 
commercial banks to attract savings away from commercial banks. In fact, the 
Post Office Savings Bank took advantage of this to keep its savings deposit rate 
at 13.75 percent until October, 1988, while all other financial institutions 
decreased theirs to 10.75 percent in April, 1988. But from 1 May 1990, all 
deposit and lending interest rates were liberalized with appropriate signals for 
change to be given by changes in the bank rate whenever necessary. 
Another development that has probably affected the competitiveness of 
various financial institutions is the introduction of a 10 percent withholding tax 
on interest income in 1988 (Daily Times, 6 October 1988, p. 6). This tax applies 
to individuals who pay income tax and is payable on interest income exceeding 
K 100.00 per annum. Previously, tax on interest income was payable only by 
depositors at the New Building Society and by companies depositing funds at 
commercial banks and the New Building Society whose accounts are audited. 
Interest income from the Post Office Savings Bank was and still is exempt from 
income tax. The introduction of the withholding tax implies that the net return to 
large depositors is now lower at the commercial banks than at the Post Office 
Savings Bank, whereas before it had been the same. However, owing to the 
comparative inefficiency of the Post Office Savings Bank, the reduction in the 
return on deposits at commercial banks has made the Post Office hardly more 
competitive. 
More recently, Government has made a number of proposals to expand the 
provision of resources for smallholder farmers and SME credit. One of these 
aims at improving the services offered by the POSB to enable it to mobilize 
more resources. In addition, a review is under way to determine whether the 
POSB should extend credit to rural traders and manufacturing enterprises. At 
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present, the POSB lends money to Government only. Extending credit to SMEs 
will need considerable modification to buildings and retraining of employees. 
As such, the benefits from this project, if implemented, will only be felt in the 
long-term. Among other things, Government is encouraging the commercial 
banking sector to become involved in financing SMEs by introducing a loan- 
guarantee facility at SEDOM and may, through legislation, direct a specific 
volume of lending resources to this sector (Malawi Government, 1988a). 
Whether government will be able to adopt the latter course of action will depend 
on the attitude of the commercial banking sector. Yet another proposal is to let 
the Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives (MUSCCO) play an 
active role in funding investment and working capital needs of SMEs and get 
involved in the possible mobilisation of financial savings (Malawi Government, 
1988a). 
Investment in housing, both for rental and owner-occupiers, has declined 
sharply in recent years, partly as a result of lack of funds. A new investment 
facility was introduced in 1988 at the New Building Society allowing tax-free 
interest payments—up to a given maximum—on special deposits by companies 
and individuals. The interest rate, which initially was 9.25 percent, now stands 
at 10.75 percent per annum for individual savers. For corporate savers the rate of 
interest of 9.25 percent still applies. The Society will be encouraged to use this 
facility to design relatively attractive mortgate arrangements for first-time 
buyers (Malawi Government, 1 988a). 
Generally, the trend in savings and investment in the country is also 
downward. Gross domestic savings fell from 14.9 percent of GDP in 1979 to 
11.4 percent in 1980 and 8.4 percent in 1986. Although the savings rate 
increased subsequently, to 12.5 percent in 1987, it was still below the rate 
achieved earlier. Subsequently, the rate of domestic saving declined to 8.9 per- 
cent in 1988 and 4.0 percent in 1989 (Malawi Government, 1990). The share of 
gross fixed investment declined from 30.9 percent of GDP in 1978 to 12.9 
percent in 1987, again below the rate achieved in the earlier period (Malawi 
Government, 1988b), but subsequently increased to 15.5 percent in 1989 
(Malawi Government, 1990). 
The growth of domestic savings in relation to investment is expected to 
remain low in the medium term. This implies that the economy will continue to 
rely heavily on external sources of finance. Considering the adverse 
repercusions of foreign commercial borrowing, likely limitations to the 
availability of foreign concessionary funding, as well as limitations on foreign 
borrowing imposed by the Paris Club, the country must take measures to 
increase the level of domestic savings. 
The existence and development of the informal financial sector 
Savings and financing of investment and consumption are known to be carried 
on in Malawi by moneylenders (katapila or chimbazo) and other informal 
lenders, such as traders, shopkeepers, farmers, relatives, neighbours, friends, co- 
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In contrast, informal financial market enterprises operate in many more 
places, both urban and rural. The rate of return on money deposited with SCAs 
is much higher and positive in real terms (see below), while rates of interest 
charged by moneylenders are generally higher than those charged by formal and 
semi-formal financial markets and positive in real terms. 
With respect to macroeconomic conditions and policies, Malawi with a 1987 
GNP per capita of US$160, is a low-income economy (World Bank, 1989, p. 
164). Besides, the distribution of income is very unequal, with the bottom 40 
percent of the population receiving only 21.5 percent of the income according to 
1967—1 968 data (World Bank, 1982). These conditions put pressure on people 
to engage in informal economic activities, including informal financial 
transactions, as a way of augmenting their income. The economic development 
that has taken place in the economy since independence in 1964 has offered a lot 
of opportunity and the means for such informal economic activity. 
Furthermore, whereas the 1970s were a period of steady economic growth, 
external and internal financial stability and low rates of inflation, the 1 980s have 
been an era of instability on all fronts. The economic instability has created yet 
new pressures that have resulted in the intensification of informal activity and 
the formation of new formal financial enterprises. For example, the fact that 94 
percent of the co-operative savings association and 78 percent of the savings and 
credit associations were formed in the 1980s is partly attributable to the decline 
in real incomes. Participation in SCAs is seen as a means of earning extra 
income to prevent a further decline in one's standard of living. Partly it is 
attributable to a fiscal adjustment policy which reduced holiday transport 
allowances due to civil servants with a view to reducing the budget deficit. Yet 
another factor that may have contributed to the mushrooming of SCAs was the 
decision taken by the monetary authorities in 1976 to restrain commercial bank 
lending for consumption. Another reason is to give teachers a ready source of 
credit, thus making it possible to borrow within their school instead of outside. 
For similar reasons, the 1980s have witnessed the establishment of 90 percent 
of the moneylenders (katapila), and 79 percent of other lenders who include 
landlords, smallholder farmers, relatives, friends, neighbours, traders, grain 
millers, employers and others. The earliest established informal financial 
institutions date back to 1940. 
The characteristics of informal financial institutions, the repression of formal 
and semi-formal financial institutions and macroeconomic conditions and 
policies reinforce one another to promote the development of and perpetuate the 
informal financial sector. 
The distribution of informal lenders and borrowers among various 
occupational groups illustrates the popularity of informal finance with relatively 
low-income groups. Almost one-third of those in the main survey for this study 
who stated that they belonged to SCAs were primary school teachers, while 
about one-third of those who belonged to CSAs were labourers/messengers. 
Labourers/messengers were also prominent in the lending carried out by friends, 
relatives and neighbours and in the membership of community funds. 
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Of the self-employed, traders, vendors and smallholder farmers dominated in 
terms of participation in various lending and borrowing schemes. As far as 
women are concerned, more than three-quarters took part in SCAs and CSAs, 
close to one-half lent money to their friends, about one-quarter lent money to 
their relatives, and about one-fifth lent money to their neighbours. About one- 
half of the women sampled reported borrowing money and about one-quarter 
took part in community funds. The proportions of men participating in the 
various lending and borrowing activities were comparable. 
The law seems neither to encourage nor to discourage informal financial 
markets (IFMs). The existence of informal moneylending activities is 
acknowledged through the Loans Recovery Act (Cap. 6:04) of the Laws of 
Malawi whose aim is to limit hardship inflicted on borrowers by high interest 
rates. Court action can be initiated by the lender or the borrower. The approach 
is, understandably, moral rather than economic. Economically we would expect 
the borrower to have made a rational decision in borrowing from a given source, 
at least in terms of alternative sources of credit accessible to him and his 
capacity to repay the capital and pay interest charges at the agreed rate. The Act 
does not specify the types of moneylenders: they could be individual people, 
traders, or SCAs. 
There is no Act which acknowledges the existence of CSAs and SCAs. The 
Cooperative Societies Act (Cap. 47:02) is for registered societies, which are the 
ones it recognizes. Nonetheless, the objective of a co-operative society as stated 
in this Act is the same for an SCA or a CSA, namely the promotion of the 
economic interest of its members. Turning the CSAs and SCAs into legal 
entities, say through the Cooperative Societies Act, may even reduce their 
efficiency in meeting their objectives. Speed and flexibility of action may be re- 
duced through rules and regulations (on membership and other aspects) that they 
have to follow, as well as an additional volume of internal documentation and 
correspondence with the relevant Government ministry. It would also be costly 
to operate through additional paper work and payment of registration fees. 
If moneylenders and other informal proprietary interests were turned into 
formal financial institutions, they would face the same operational difficulties 
that CSAs and SCAs would encounter. In addition, transforming all these 
informal financial institutions into formal financial institutions would not be 
easy. The new Banking Act stipulates that a deposit-accepting bank or non-bank 
can only be established with a minimum capital of K2 million. To establish a 
non-deposit-accepting financial institution would require K250,000. Clearly, 
these sums are beyond the means of most of informal financial institutions. 
III. Sources of data 
Most of the data used in this study2 have been drawn from a random sample 
survey of 1,611 households.3 The survey covered seven districts, two cities, two 
townships and three administrative centres (bomas),4 the selection of which 
represented the first stage of sampling. Two years earlier the whole country had 
been demarcated into enumeration areas for census purposes. The second phase 
of sampling entailed random selection of a number of enumeration areas from 
the above districts, cities, townships and bomas. An intermediate phase carried 
out in cities only, was the random selection of wards which included both high- 
income and low-income sectors. 
The random selection of households was left to the field supervisors who led 
teams of enumerators into the field to carry out the interviews. The principal 
investigators trained the enumerators and assisted supervisors to control the 
work of the enumerators. The system of control was useful at the beginning of 
the survey in each region as most of the enumerators and supervisors had little 
field experience. The period of training was short. This factor together with non- 
response, errors in interviewing and coding were the main sources of errors in 
the survey. However, we believe that these errors are not serious. 
Unusual observations, either large or small, have been removed from the data. 
An attempt to weight estimates of numbers of borrowers, lenders and savers has 
also been made. But the results of this exercise have not been included in the 
study because estimates of credit based on weighted estimates of borrowers 
were lower than those based on estimates of lenders and on the other samples of 
lenders. Normally, for fear of of taxation, lenders are expected to hide more 
information than borrowers, who have nothing to lose. 
The data generated by the main survey are presented both in the text and in 
the tables. The amount of credit extended by the informal financial sector during 
1988 is shown in Table 8. The entry against firms in column (1) refers to inter- 
firm credit which was obtained from secondary sources. The rest has been 
estimated from information on average sums borrowed or lent by the various 
informal financial sector entities. Column (2) shows the relative distribution of 
informal financial sector credit in 1988, while column (3) shows the average 
credit period in months. Multiplying the figure in column (1) by the figure in 
column (3) and dividing the result by 12 gives us the figure in column (4), 
which is the amount of credit extended on an annual basis. This figure can then 
be compared with data on formal-sector credit which is usually granted for a 
period of one year (Table 9). 
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Table 8 Credit extended in 1988 (all to private sector) 
Rank Lender 
Credit Percentage Average credit (11 x (3) 
extended distribution of period 12 
(K million) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. Employers 79.8 28.3 5.4 35.9 
2. Friends 49.2 17.5 2.0 8.2 
3. Estate owners 40.2 14.3 5.6 18.8 
4. Firms 24.5 8.7 12.0 24.5 
5. Relatives 23.7 8.4 2.0 4.0 
6. SCAs 17.8 6.3 1.0 1.5 
7. Neighbours 10.9 3.9 2.0 1.8 
8. Moneylenders 9.6 3.4 2.0 1.6 
9. Traders 7.2 2.6 2.0 1.2 
10. Grain millers 2.5 0.9 10.0 2.1 
11. Smallholder 
farmers 2.0 0.7 6.0 1.0 
12. Community 
funds 1.7 0.6 1.0 0.1 
13. Other 12.4 4.4 3.7 3.8 
Total 281.5 100.0 451 104.5 
1. Weighted average credit period. 
Table 9 FFM: Yearly increase in credit to private sector (K million) 
Year CBs NBs MC INDEBANK Insurance 
Co. 
LFC Total 



























1. Assumed as equal to 1988. 
Note: We have derived the weighted average maturity period for FM credit extended during 1988 as 
4.5 months (see Table 8). In order to spread the less-than-one-year 'credit effect" on economic 
activity over a full year, the 4.5 month period has been used to reduce proportionately the total 
of IFM short-term credits extended during 1988 to an annual equivalent that is comparable with 
the annual change in FFM credit. 
Since FFM credit, especially that extended by commercial banks (which is the largest part), 
has been subject to substantial year-to-year fluctuations due to official credit controls and sea- 
sonal factors, it is more realistic to use the average of three years centred on 1988, i.e. K85.71 
million (see Table 9), for purposes of comparing with FM credit in that year. i.e. K104.5 million. 
Apart from borrowing by tenants on burley tobacco estates, FM credit is likely to be less 
sensitive to seasonal factors. 
Adding semi-formal financial sector credit of K19 million (smallholder agricultural credit fund 
K15 million and INDEFUND/SEDOM K3 million) gives total credit for 1988 of K107.91 million. 
Based on the foregoing credit comparison, the result is that the informal financial sector in 
Malawi is about the same size as the formal and semi-formal financial sector. 
The structure of informal financial sector interest rates is shown in Table 10. 
The relevant data have been annualized to facilitate comparison with interest 
rates in the formal and semi-formal financial sector. The annual weighted 
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average interest rates in the informal financial sector are shown in Table 11. 
These figures were arrived at by multiplying the credit extended on an annual 
basis shown in column (1) by the average annual rate of interest (2) and then by 
dividing the sum of column (3) by the total weight (the sum of column (1)). 
Table 10 The informal financial sector: Structure of annual interest rates (%) 





1. Unweighted average annual interest rate. 
2. Weighted average annual interest rate. 
Nominal Real1 
Deposit rates Lending rates Deposit rates Lending rates 
N/A 300—1,200 N/A 284.3—1184.3 
N/A 2—25 N/A (—)13.7—9.3 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 





















































N/A = not applicable 
* 
= dividend rates 
1. On the basis of an annual inflation rate of 15.7 percent in 1989. 
Rank Lender Credit in annual Average annual (1) x (2) 
equivalent interest rate (%) 
(1) (2) (3) 
1. Employers 35.9 7.4 265.7 
2. Friends 8.2 0.0 0.0 
3. Estate owners 18.8 5.7 107.2 
4. Firms 24.5 17.0 416.5 
5. Relatives 4.0 0.0 0.0 
6. SCA5 1.5 156.0 234.0 
7. Neighbours 1.8 0.0 0.0 
8. Moneylenders 1.6 720.0 1,152.0 
9. Traders 1.2 0.0 0.0 
10. Grain millers 2.1 0.0 0.0 
11. Smallholderfarmers 1.0 0.0 0.0 
12. Communityfunds 0.1 118.8 11.9 
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At the planning stage it was hoped that use would be made of data from 
several secondary sources, including national sample surveys of agriculture and 
urban expenditure surveys. Accordingly, informal financial data were extracted 
from these sources. Unfortunately, the data were found to be gross 
underestimates of informal savings, borrowing and lending. The major problem 
was that the boundary of the informal financial sector was not properly de- 
marcated. In the 1968/69 National Sample Survey of Agriculture, for example, 
only loans from relatives or friends and businessmen were included in the 
questionnaire. As far as savings are concerned, only hiding money and giving it 
to a friend for safeguarding were covered. Although an "other" category was 
included, it is believed that because the question was not precise, respondents 
did not bother to answer it. In the 1980/81 National Sample Survey of 
Agriculture, the source of credit was not even specified, while in the expenditure 
surveys, only loans from moneylenders and from friends or relatives were 
included. 
The only secondary sources of data that have proved useful are the Financial 
and Economic Reviews of the Reserve Bank of Malawi (for data on formal 
sector bank deposits and credit), the Annual Economic Surveys (for data on 
inter-firm credit), and census reports (for data on population distribution and 
economic status). 
The relevant secondary data are shown in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9. 
Malawi does not have an acceptable measure of consumer price inflation 
representive of all social groups or all urban and rural areas. For the period 
1968—1980, the only consumer price index that can be used is the Blantyre low 
income group consumer price index (Table 1). But even this suffers from 
omissions of important items of expenditure like personal taxes, dowry and 
house rents. For the period after 1980, a composite retail price index is 
available, but it covers only two cities (Table 2). Besides, it leaves out some 
important items of expenditure. For these reasons, changes in prices as 
measured by the GDP deflator have also been presented (Table 3) and used in 
this study. 
The data on formal financial sector nominal interest rates are presented in 
Table 4. These nominal interest rates have been deflated into real interest rates 
using the procedure explained at the bottom of Table 7. 
Lastly, data on the number of branches of certain deposit-taking institutions 
are shown in Table 5, while the density of bank branches is shown in Table 6. 
Information and data from the pilot survey have been used as well. In this 
survey, 71 rural households were randomly selected for interviews in the 
Rumphi Agricultural Development Project of the Mzuzu Agricultural 
Development Division. Out of these, 43 were borrowers and 28 were lenders. 
Some 32 estate owners (landlords) and 6 tenants were also interviewed, but 
these were not strictly randomly selected. Also purposely selected were 10 
moneylenders and 15 clients of moneylenders drawn from Blantyre and Zomba 
urban areas; 60 members of savings and credit associations drawn from Blantyre 
City and Zomba Rural District; and three traders and three borrowers from 
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traders. The principal investigators personally conducted some of the interviews. 
The rest were conducted by five assistants. 
Data and information from two previous surveys have also been used in this 
study. These are a random sample survey of 76 wage earners in Zomba who 
were interviewed on their involvement in co-operative savings associations, and 
a sample survey of moneylenders and their clients at Walker's Ferry in Blantyre 
Rural District. 
IV. Survey and other results 
Proprietary informal financial institutions 
Moneylenders (katapila) 
The number of respondents who reported moneylending was 64, or 2.5 percent 
of the total. The amount of money lent during 1988 ranged from K2 to K500, 
with a mean of KI 30.98. For the country as a whole, the total sum lent by 
moneylenders has been estimated at K9.6 million. The amount of money repaid 
to respondents during 1988 ranged from K7 to Kl,000, with a mean of K199.61 
(urban mean K 136.73 and rural mean K235.84). The smaller sums lent and 
repaid might reflect errors in identifying moneylenders, who are expected to 
lend large sums, and other types of lenders. The main sources of the money lent 
were farming (52 percent of the cases), salaries (25 percent of the cases) and 
business (22 percent of the cases). Most of the moneylenders (72 percent) were 
able to meet the whole demand for credit. Only 28 percent were not. Among 
those who were able to recollect, the shortfall in resources ranged from K3 to 
K700. 
As regards the terms and conditions of credit, 57 percent of the loans were 
granted for one month, 26 percent for one year, and 17 percent for other time 
periods. The rate of interest charged ranged from 25 percent to 100 percent. The 
mean rate of interest is about 60 percent. There were two modes, 50 percent 
(charged by 40 percent of the lenders), and 100 percent, charged by 43 percent 
of the lenders. 
The rates of interest charged by moneylenders are regarded by the general 
public as usurious. The term pilipili (pepper) used for loans bearing 100 percent 
interest per month reflects this disapproval (Mwalwanda, 1986). So does the 
term mwala-ku-mwala (stone-for-stone). To make matters worse, if a borrower 
defaults, extra interest is charged at the rate agreed upon. However, the effective 
rate of interest might be lower if the borrower takes longer than the agreed time 
period to repay the loan and if extra interest is not charged (Chipeta, 1981). The 
effective rate of interest might also be lower if there are defaults. Fortunately, 
defaults are likely to be minimized, especially in the long run, by confining 
lending to honest borrowers. In effective terms, the katapila rate of interest has 
been worked out to be 28.6 percent per month. 
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A number of reasons have been advanced as to why moneylenders charge 
higher nominal rates of interest than formal lenders. As some authors have 
pointed out (Bottomley, 1971), administrative costs are a small component of 
interest rates in informal financial markets in LDCs. However, in the case of 
katapila lenders in Malawi, it may not be negligible judging from the partial 
evidence of the number of days per month spent on disbursement of credit and 
collection of repayments, especially if a good part of the day is spent on this 
activity by the moneylender. The opportunity cost of lending has also been 
considered as a small component of interest rates in informal financial markets 
in LDCs because the moneylender's alternative of depositing his funds in formal 
financial institutions is unattractive since the latter's deposit interest rates are 
much lower (Bottomley, 1971), a situation which also prevails in Malawi. 
Besides, few other attractive investment opportunities are open to moneylenders 
in Malawi. 
It is of interest to note that the present monthly 100 percent interest rate has 
prevailed for several years in many parts of Malawi. This calls into question the 
degree of influence on the determination of interest rates charged by 
moneylenders arising from factors which vary from year to year. The factor of 
particular interest here is the theoretically plausible influence of changes in 
income levels in the economy (more especially borrowers' incomes) on the 
other components of interest rates in the informal financial markets, i.e. default 
risk premium and monopoly profit. With the fluctuations in incomes seen in 
recent years, these interest-rate components should also have changed and 
consequently brought about some variations in the rates charged by 
moneylenders, but no variation appears to have taken place. On the other hand, 
interest rates charged by formal financial institutions changed in recent years. 
This is not to say that risk premium and monopoly profit have absolutely no 
part in interest rates charged by moneylenders in Malawi. What we do know is 
that the high levels of interest rates in question (particularly that of 100 percent) 
have their origin in the concept of katapila, and are based on the customary 
principle of profit-sharing (Chipeta, 1981). 
In case where a debtor fails to repay, the creditor may have recourse to the 
guarantor (mboni or kaboni). The mboni is usually a trusted man or relation of 
the debtor who is introduced by the debtor to the creditor for the purpose of 
testifying to the credit-worthiness of the debtor or, in reality, his honesty. The 
mboni pays only in the event of a defaulting debtor. He pays because he chose to 
be guarantor for the obligation and bears the consequences of the borrower's 
dishonesty. Forty-eight percent of the moneylenders interviewed in the main 
survey insisted on having the mboni as security. Thirty-nine percent required 
only the signature of the borrower. Confiscating the debtor's property is an 
alternative means of recovering the debt where neither personal nor material 
security is available (Matewere, 1988). Among lenders covered by the main 
survey who experienced default on their latest loans, 32 percent stopped 
granting further loans. 
That moneylending is an important source of income can be gauged from the 
fact that 30 percent of the creditors stated that they obtained half their income, 
19 percent more than half, and 3 percent all their income from this type of 
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business. For the economy as a whole, interest income from moneylending has 
been estimated at K5.7 million for 1988. Seventeen percent of the moneylenders 
spent half their time on lending, and 9 percent more than half. The mean number 
of days spent on lending and recovering loans was 5.9 and 5.5 respectively. The 
high rates of interest help to cover these administrative costs. 
Estate owners (landlords) 
There are approximately 4,000 registered burley tobacco growers who own 
estates (Malawi Government, 1989a). Most of these estates owners employ 
tenant labour to produce their crop. Tenants are supplied with inputs and 
provisions on credit. The data use in this part of the study have been estimated 
from those supplied by borrowers (tenants), as reconciled with data supplied by 
the estate owners themselves and data collected in the pilot survey. 
The mean sum lent by estate owners in 1988 was K10,042. The amounts lend 
by individual estate owners were correlated with the level of income. 
Altogether, it has been estimated that K40.2 million was lent to their tenants. 
The majority (51.5 percent), lent inputs at a relatively low rate of 5 percent 
per annum following an official directive not to charge high rates of interest. 
The relatively low rate of interest acts as an incentive to tenants. A further 9.1 
percent charged only 2 percent per annum. Of the remaining owners, 18.2 
percent lent at 17 percent per annum and 9.1 percent lent at 25 percent per 
annum. Interest earned has been estimated at K2.3 million. 
About 59 percent of the estate owners demanded some form of security. For 
41.4 percent, signatures of tenants were enough. No action was taken on 
unrepaid loans for fear of losing tenants. 
Some 61.1 percent of the estate owners obtained all their income, 48.4 percent 
more than half. 19.4 percent half, and 16.1 percent less than half, indirectly 
through lending to tenants. Some 9.4 percent said that all their time was devoted 
to lending, 34.4 percent more than half, 31.3 percent half, and 25.0 percent less 
than half. The number of borrowing tenants has been estimated at 61,044 for the 
1988/89 season. 
Traders 
This category was probably covered by the Malawi/USAID survey under the 
"other" category. But the relative importance of traders as an informal source of 
credit was not ascertained, nor were the terms and conditions of credit that they 
extend. 
Using data on borrowers generated by the main survey for this study, the total 
amount of credit extended by traders in 1988 has been estimated at K7.2 million. 
Only on a handful of loans was (nominal) interest charged. The common 
practice is to grant credit to customers without charging interest as a way of 
promoting sales and good public relations (Chipeta, 1981). If interest were 
charged, fewer people would be willing to seek such credit. Had resources 
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permitted, more money could have been loaned by traders. 
As against an average sum borrowed in 1988 of K180, only K167 was repaid, 
implying an overall default rate of K 13. The average period for repayment of the 
loan was two months. 
Grain millers 
Like traders, this group was also included in the residual "other" category in the 
Malawi/USAID survey. But, again, the relative importance of grain millers as a 
source of informal credit was not ascertained, nor were the terms and conditions 
of credit granted by this group of businessmen. 
Again, using data on borrowers generated by the main survey, the total 
amount of credit extended by grain millers in 1988 has been estimated at K2.5 
million. Again, only on a handful of loans was (nominal) interest charged. The 
common practice is to grant free cash loans to members of the community in 
which they operate as a way of promoting good public relations. Had resources 
permitted, more money would have been loaned by grain millers. 
As against an average sum borrowed of K278 in 1988, an average sum of 
K342 was repaid, implying the absence of default. The difference may reflect 
the interest cost on some loans or statistical errors. The average period for 
repayment of the loans was ten months. 
Smallholder farmers 
Smaitholder farmers were also included in the residual category "other" lenders. 
Therefore, their role as an informal source of credit was not ascertained 
separately, nor were the terms and conditions of the credit that they grant. 
On the basis of data on borrowers generated by the main survey, the total 
amount of credit extended by smallholder farmers in 1988 has been estimated at 
K2.O million. Nominal interest was charged only on a few loans. The common 
practice is to grant free cash loans as a way of promoting solidarity. Had 
resources permitted, more money could have been lent by smaltholder farmers. 
On the average, borrowers took six months to repay credit. As against an 
average sum of K90 which was borrowed in 1988, an average sum of K80 was 
repaid, implying an average default rate of K1O. 
Other 
This category included a number of an unspecified businessmen and individuals: 
it was the source of K 12.4 million of credit. The terms and conditions on which 
loans were granted were similar to those that applied to most of the other lenders 
in this sub-sector. 
Data on inter-firm credit are now available. For 1988, such credit has been 
estimated at K27.5 million. 
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Mutual aid informal financial institutions 
Savings and credit associations (SCAs) 
Each member of the SCA contributes a fixed amount of money at the beginning 
of the school year, the amount varying from SCA to SCA. The amount is 
payable in a specified maximum number of months. If a member fails to 
contribute the full amount, the shortfall is subtracted from the portion he is 
supposed to receive when the fund is distributed to the members when it is 
temporarily wound up. 
A major aim is to build up as much money as possible, through interest paid 
on borrowings, for distribution to members when the fund is wound up. 
Therefore, money in the fund is always lent out to members and little or nothing 
is kept by the treasurer. Consequently, there are occasions when members who 
do not really need loans are required to borrow the balance left after other 
members have received their allocations. In some cases such involuntary bor- 
rowings have been used by members to on-lend to outsiders, especially those 
who may have found other sources of credit more expensive or have no access 
to any other source of credit. Generally, such borrowing by a member to assist 
an outsider is allowed as long as the credit requirements of members have been 
satisfied. 
The amount a member is allowed to borrow per month is expected not to be in 
excess of his monthly salary, which sets an upper limit on his known debt- 
servicing capacity since the standard credit period is one month. Loans are 
supposed to be repaid together with interest immediately after borrowers have 
received their monthly salaries, but the treasurer disburses new loans a day or 
more after pay day in order to give himself time to receive repayments of 
maturing loans and interest charges on them, out of which new loans are made. 
If a borrower fails to extinguish his debt voluntarily over a reasonable number of 
months, the extinction is involuntarily effected by deduction from his salary. 
The number of respondents who reported taking part in SCAs was 142, or 8.8 
percent of the total. The size of the SCAs ranged from 2 to 250 people, with a 
mean for the whole sample of 38.5 (urban mean 34.8 and rural mean 40.7). The 
oldest SCA was formed in 1964. Fifty percent of the respondents stated that 
their SCAs were formed so that they could have a source of loans; 30 percent 
said that they were formed to earn money for members; while 13 percent cited 
saving as the motive for establishing SCAs. 
Most of the SCAs are formed by workmates (48 percent) and neighbours (35 
percent). This makes it easy to establish and maintain contact. There are only a 
few between friends (3 percent), relatives (5 percent), and business colleagues (6 
percent). 
Eighty percent of the respondents stated that their SCAs were run by a 
committee, 13 percent by a leader, and 5 percent by all members. Employment 
earnings (51 percent of the cases) and farming (35 percent of the cases) were the 
most popular sources of money contributed to the SCAs. 
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Analysis of the main survey data has revealed that both the mean initial 
contribution and the mean monthly contribution are negatively correlated with 
the size of the savings and credit association, an indication of economies. The 
mean sum received at the end of each fund is also negatively correlated with the 
size of the savings and credit associations. In contrast, age and the number of 
dependants are positively correlated with the mean monthly contribution, as is 
the level of education. Those who are employed and those who went to school 
have a higher mean monthly contribution than the unemployed or those who did 
not go to school. Marital status does not significantly influence the size of the 
mean monthly contribution to the SCA. Religion does, with Christians 
contributing more per head than Muslims, whose mean contribution is, in turn, 
greater than that of members of other religious faiths. 
After further scrutiny of the data, the total contributions to SCAs for the 
economy for 1988 have been estimated at K8.4 million, and the total sum 
borrowed at K 17.8 million. The larger proportion of the money borrowed from 
SCAs during 1988/89 (72.7 percent) was invested (64.9 percent spent on 
fertilizer, 4.9 percent on farm labour and 2.9 percent on school fees/uniforms), 
rather than spend on consumption. Consumer goods and services claimed the 
remaining 27.3 percent (of which 2.8 percent was spent on foodstuffs). 
Similarly, out of the total sum distributed to members by SCAs during 1988/89, 
a significant proportion (38.5 percent) was invested (10.2 percent to fertilizer, 
21.4 percent to farm labour, and 6.9 percent to business). That a larger 
proportion of borrowings than of distributions was invested may reflect 
members' consciousness of the cost of funds. 
The nominal rates of interest charged on loans ranged from 10 percent to 60 
percent per month. The lower rates of interest were charged where borrowers 
wanted to benefit from cheap money. Such rates of interest are thus based on the 
needs of the members. The higher rates of interest reflect the desire of the 
members to maximize income and are based on the moneylending profit-sharing 
principle. The mean SCA lending rate was 13 percent; the median and the mode 
were both 10 percent. Interest income has been estimated at K2.3 million. For a 
formal model of savings and credit associations, See Annex 1. 
Co-operative Savings Associations 
Co-operative savings associations (CSAs) operate as follows. Each member of 
the co-operative saving group contributes an equal sum of money at the end of 
every month, or whenever income is earned. The pooling may, therefore, be 
regular or periodic. The contributions are given to members one at a time, hence 
the term co-operative savings association. No interest is charged for using the 
funds raised in this way. Members are fully compensated by receiving from 
others what they paid to them. 
The payment into the pooi reduces one's disposable income at the time when 
payment is made. The size of the reduction, determined by the income 
depressor, depends on the magnitude of the fixed contribution agreed upon. The 
major determinant of this is the level of income, but the objective of pooling 
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income may also play a role. The receipt of a contribution boosts one's 
disposable income. The size of the increase is determined by the income ampli- 
fier, the magnitude of which depends on both the amount of the fixed 
contributions and the number of contributors. 
The co-operative savings group may obtain the interest of a few or many 
people, leading to small or large groups. The groups may also vary by 
geographical ties, or by blood relationship. They could also be classified on the 
basis of friendship, age and gender. These different forms of co-operative 
savings groups may have different economic implications. 
The number of respondents who reported taking part in CSAs (chiperegani) 
was 221, or 13.7 percent of the total. The size of CSAs ranged from 2 to 50 
members (59 percent of them having only 2 members). In 54 percent of the 
cases CSAs were formed between workmates, while in 13, 12, and 14 percent, 
they were formed between friends, relatives and neighbours, respectively. In 58 
percent of the cases, CSAs were formed to raise money for the members and in 
25 percent to force members to save. The mean contribution per head per period 
was K34.07 (urban mean K28.8 and rural mean K39.57). 
The mean contribution is negatively correlated with the size of the 
membership, implying that numbers create economies. Also negatively 
correlated with the mean contribution are the level of education and the length 
of the contribution period. Positively correlated with the mean contributiOn are 
monthly earnings, age, and the number of dependants. The contribution of the 
married is greater than that of the single. The mean contribution of those who 
are not employed but who may have businesses, is greater than that of those who 
stated that they were employed. As is the case in SCAs, the mean contribution 
of Christians in CSAs is bigger than the mean contribution of Muslims and 
others. 
The main sources of CSA money were salaries (62 percent), business (14 
percent), and farming (14 percent). In 68 percent of the cases, contributions 
were made monthly. The total amount of resources mobilized by the CSAs in 
1988 has been estimated at KS 1.6 million. 
Drawing lots is not a popular way of deciding who should receive the 
contributions first as it affected only 1 percent of the members. Neither is 
seniority (4 percent). Negotiation is the most popular method (83 percent), with 
"other" second (12 percent). 
With respect to allocation of CSA resources, it has been estimated that 56.1 
percent was spent on consumer goods in 1988. Of this proportion, the largest 
share (24.5 percent) was allocated to the purchase of foodstuffs. Out of the 
remainder, 5.1 percent was saved and 38.8 percent was invested (school fees and 
uniforms 1.8 percent, farm labour 33.6 percent, and fertiliser 3.4 percent). 
From the above and on the basis of other studies (Chipeta, 1987), the 
characteristics of CSAs may be summed up as follows: 
1. They are popular among low income earners who find them a convenient 
means of augmenting their incomes. They are not popular among higher 
income groups for whom there is less need to augment wage income; 
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2. Most of the chiperegani are two-person societies formed by mutual 
agreement among workmates, friends, relatives or neighbours who trust each 
other, and who are in frequent contact. For this reason, there is little friction 
among the members and the clubs seem to operate relatively smoothly. 
Besides, the return benefit in terms of receipts of contributions from partners 
is received within a short period of time. However, the small size of the clubs 
and the low income of the members mean that the size of the contribution, 
and hence the benefit, is limited. In turn, this implies that there is a limit to 
what they can spend their cash on. (With low contributions, if the 
membership is larger, the benefit would be greater as the income amplifier, 
the coefficient by which one's income rises, would be larger as well.) In 
Blantyre, the average chiperegani had five members (Mhango, 1985); 
3. The money mobilized through chiperegani costs nothing in terms of interest; 
the receiver pays back exactly what he or she got from other people. 
Inevitably, he or she must wait; 
4. Chiperegani tend to be short-lived. They exist only as long as the members 
are willing and able to contribute money. If the members have no further 
desire for the items for which they formed the associations or should their 
real income fall, the clubs easily become dissolved. Thus, to most members 
the benefits from chiperegani are short-term; 
5. Most members of chiperegani seek credit from other sources. This is a further 
reflection of the inadequacy of resources raised through these associations; 
6. Most of the members of chiperegani spend receipts of contributions on 
projects and items that can be said to promote development, e.g. the purchase 
or production of food, the construction or improvement of housing, and the 
payment of fees for school children. Only a few reported spending the 
contribution on non-productive items like drink. The important role that 
chiperegani (as well as katapila) has played in financing house construction 
among low income groups in Blantyre city has been highlighted elsewhere 
(Mhango, 1985); 
7. As informal organizations, chiperegani are easy to establish, manage and 
dissolve. They also cost less to operate. 
For a formal model of CSAs, see Annex 1. 
Community funds 
These funds are established by local community groups. The groups could be 
social, religious, civic, etc. In rural areas, a fund may be associated with a 
particular village or a group of villages. 
Some 18.5 percent of the people interviewed in the main survey stated that 
they belonged to a community fund. The mean fund size is 88 people with a 
large standard deviation. The mean urban fund size is 168, while the mean rural 
fund size is 55. In 70 percent of the funds, money is raised through financial 
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contributions, while in 27 percent resource mobilization is through group work. 
Of those who mobilize resources by working for them, 89 percent perform 
agricultural work for pay. 
The mean contribution per head in 1988 was K5.21. The mean rural 
contribution per head was K3.5 1, while the mean urban contribution per head 
was K8.40 due to higher per capita income in urban areas. The mean 
contribution per member is negatively correlated with the size of the 
membership and the age of the members, but positively correlated with the level 
of education, the number of dependants and the level of monthly earnings. 
Most of the contributions are annual or periodic. Altogether, it has been 
estimated that K4.3 million was mobilized by community funds in 1988. Some 
41 percent of the funds were used to finance private emergencies only, 18 
percent to finance community projects only, and 28 percent to finance both 
private emergencies and community projects. In 39 percent of the funds, the 
money could be lent out to members with or without interest. The rate of interest 
ranged from 5 percent to 50 percent. The lower rates of interest are based on the 
needs of the members, whereas the higher rates of interest are based on the same 
custom that governs interest rates under moneylenders (katapila). Interest 
income amounted to K 166,332, assuming that credit amounted to Ki .7 million. 
Most of the funds (61 percent) are run by committees. Only in 28 percent of 
the cases is the business of running the fund entrusted to a leader. The treasurer 
is usually a trusted member of the community. For a formal model of 
community funds, see Annex 1. 
Staff and social welfare funds 
Employers 
Employers may lend out of funds of their organizations set aside for this purpose 
or out of money contributed to a special fund by senior or better-paid 
employees. In the former case, management or administration would run the 
fund. In the latter case, a special committee of employees may be appointed to 
run the fund. 
Using data on borrowers generated by the main survey, the total amount of 
credit granted to employees by their employers in 1988 has been estimated at 
K79.8 million. Some loans were not granted at interest. For those on which 
interest was charged, the rate was usually below 10 percent per annum. The data 
on credit and interest rates have been checked against data on staff loans 
provided by a number of organizations. Employers earned interest income of 
K5.9 million on their lending in 1989. 
The average repayment period was 5.1 months. Had resources permitted, 
more money would have been loaned to staff by employers. 
Friends 
Along with relatives and neighbours, this is the most informal category, but at 
the same time the most popular source of informal finance. Out of 1,611 people 
interviewed in the main survey, 210, or 13 percent reported that they borrowed 
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money from friends in 1988. The total amount of credit has been estimated at 
K49. I million. The loan was repaid in an average of two months. On most of the 
loans no interest was charged as lenders used these loans to promote and 
maintain friendship. 
Relatives 
Eighty respondents, about 5 percent of the total, reported borrowing from their 
relatives. The total sum borrowed during 1988 has been estimated at K23.7 
million. The loan was repaid in an average of less than two months. Interest was 
not charged on most of the loans as lenders use them to promote solidarity. 
Neighbours 
Thirty-three respondents, or 2 percent of the total, reported borrowing from their 
neighbours. The total sum borrowed during 1988 has been estimated at K10.8 
million. The loan was repaid in an average of two months, again implying that 
most of the loans were short-term, and most of them were interest free as lenders 
used them to promote social relations. 
Allocation of loans 
Estimates of allocation of loans by sources are not available. Out of the total 
sum of loans granted by employers, friends, relatives, neighbours, traders, 
moneylenders and smallholder farmers, 74.6 percent was invested (business 
59.5 percent, farm labour 3.1 percent and fertilizer 12.0 percent). The sum spend 
on consumption was 25.4 percent of the total. The single largest proportion (9.5 
percent), was used to purchase foodstuffs. 
The size of the informal financial sector 
In a pioneering attempt to measure the size of the informal financial sector, U 
Tun Wai (1957) estimated the ratio of agricultural or rural indebtedness to the 
claims of the banking system on the private sector for 16 countries.5 He found 
that in half the sample the size of the informal financial sector was larger than 
the formal financial sector in the 1950s. But in the 1970s, in only three countries 
out of a sample of 17 countries6 was the informal financial sector larger than the 
formal one. However, in about half the sample, the informal financial sector was 
at least three-quarters the size of the formal financial sector (U Tun Wai, 1977). 
The technique used in those studies assumes that informal lenders operate in 
rural areas only. In Malawi, as perhaps in several other countries where they 
operate both in rural and urban areas, one would need to estimate the ratio of 
informal borrower indebtedness to the claim of the banking system on the 
private sector. 
Unfortunately, while data on the claims of the banking system on the private 
sector are available, data on the claims of the informal financial sector are not. 
For this reason, we have compared credit extended by the informal financial 
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sector (all of it to the private sector) with credit extended by the banking system 
to the private sector in 1988. The total amount of credit extended by the 
informal financial sector has been estimated at K281.5 million, while that 
extended by the formal and semi-formal financial sector was K107.9 million, 
implying that the formal and semi-formal financial sector was less than half the 
size of the informal financial sector. Employers were as large as the formal and 
semi-formal financial sector. Estate owners and friends were relatively large 
sub-sectors of the informal financial sector. These results are subject to the 
limitation that we are generally comparing very short-term credit granted by the 
informal financial sector with not so short-term credit extended by the formal 
and semi-formal financial sector,7 and that we are comparing net changes in the 
claims of the latter with gross changes in the claims of the former.8 
An alternative method of assessing the relative sizes of the informal and 
formal financial sectors might be to compare the amount of savings mobilized 
by each sector. Savings mobilized by the formal financial sector have been 
equated with the change in deposit liabilities of banks and non-banks to the 
public. For the informal financial sector, savings have been equated with the 
credit extended by various entities. The credit extended by traders has been 
excluded on the ground that it is all used to finance consumption. The resources 
mobilized by community funds have also been excluded on similar grounds. 
CSAs do not extend credit, but the proportion of their resources which is 
invested has been regarded as savings. 
The results of the alternative method are similar to those of the other 
technique. The formal sector mobilized additional resources of only K72.9 
million in 1989, while the informal sector mobilized savings equal to K265.6 
million, implying that the size of the formal financial sector is less than a third 
the size of the informal financial sector. 
V. Conclusions 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from what has been said above. First, as 
measured by the ratio of credit extended by the informal financial sector to the 
private sector to credit extended by the formal and semi-formal financial sector 
to the same sector, the informal financial sector in Malawi is larger than the 
formal and semi-formal financial sector. The same result is arrived at by 
comparing savings mobilized by the formal and informal financial sectors. 
Estate owners and friends are relatively large sub-sectors of the informal 
financial sector. Employers are as large as the formal financial sector. As for 
future prospects, the informal financial sector will remain relatively large even 
in the long run. Current macroeconomic conditions and policies, which partly 
explain the growth of the informal financial sector, are likely to remain the same 
in the future. The indigenous economy, which accounts for its existence, is also 
likely to remain large, while repression of the formal and semi-formal financial 
sector and the operational advantages of the informal financial sector will 
continue. 
Secondly, the large size of the informal financial sector implies that official 
monetary data understate the volume of financial savings and credit in the 
economy. Furthermore, it does imply that monetary policy instruments are 
targetted at a small proportion of financial transactions. Whether this adversely 
affecLs the efficacy of monetary policy will be the subject of a later study. In 
principle, the effectiveness of monetary control can be reduced if borrowers can 
evade the controlled money market by using the informal market (Courakis, 
1984). Changes in the distribution of resources between formal and informal 
financial markets may also lead to distortions in money-supply statistics, thus 
giving a false view of the degree of monetary control. 
Thirdly, the informal financial sector seems to be playing an important role in 
alleviating economic hardship among low-income groups. That role is played by 
enabling these groups to mobilize resources (the savings effect), to use those 
resources to earn income (the investment effect), and by enabling them to obtain 
loans (the credit effect). With respect to the savings effect, all informal financial 
institutions play a significant role, especially employers, estate owners, 
businessmen, friends, relatives, SCAs (where savings are encouraged by high 
positive real rates of return, the possibility of borrowing from the fund of 
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savings, and the commitment of a fixed amount of savings per period), and 
CSAs (where savings are encouraged by the commitment to a fixed amount of 
saving per period and the share in the pooi which is fairly immediate because of 
the small size of the CSAs). Apart from CSAs, all these informal financial 
institutions play a significant role with regard to the credit effect. But in terms of 
the investment effect, the crucial role is that which is fulfilled by employers, 
SCAs, katapila and estate owners. 
A significant proportion of informal sector loanable funds is directed at the 
priority agricultural sector. Although some of the informal financial sector 
resources are used to finance consumption, to the extent that they are spent on 
basic needs (e.g. purchase or production of food, payment of water bills, the 
construction or improvement of housing and the payment of school fees) they 
promote development and lie within priority sectors. For lack of data it has not 
been possible to ascertain whether marginal rates of return on investment 
financed by informal sector savings are larger than those financed by formal 
sector savings. 
Considering the informal financial sector as a whole, a significant part of the 
loans does not bear interest, which is contrary to the common belief that interest 
rates in the informal financial sector are generally higher than in the formal 
financial sector. Few of the traders, farmers, friends, relatives and neighbours 
charge interest on the loans that they grant. Traders may be looking at free loans 
as a means of maintaining and improving relations with their customers, while 
the rest may regard them as a means of maintaining solidarity. Estate owners 
charge interest varying from 2 percent to 25 percent, the mean being 5.7 percent. 
At the current rate of inflation, this mean is negative. Estate owners derive most 
of their benefit from the tobacco grown by tenants. Only rates of interest 
applicable to katapila and savings and credit associations are in most cases 
higher than those in the formal and semi-formal financial sector and positive in 
real terms. But the weighted average lending rate in the informal financial sector 
is lower than the average lending rate in the formal and semi-formal sector 
(Tables 4 and 11). 
As regards income and employment generation, informal lending by landlords 
is indirectly (via the tobacco grown by tenants) an important source of income 
and employment. Lending by moneylenders is an important source of income 
and self-employment. Lending by savings and credit associations is also an 
important source of income (to friends, relatives, and neighbours it is not). 
Moreover, katapila and SCAs are more profitable ways of generating income 
than investment in formal financial institutions. This, and the findings above, 
would justify the inclusion of these informal entities in the country's plans for 
promoting small- and medium-scale enterprises through the provision of start-up 
and working capital (which some find inadequate) and through the provision of 
business and technical advisory services. 
Furthermore, because SCAs are playing an important intermediation role, 
there is justification for including them in policies for promoting savings, 
efficient allocation of loanable funds and the extent of financial intermediation. 
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The ability of informal markets to generate and lend resources is constrained by 
a number of factors. For co-operative savings association, the main constraints 
are the small size of the associations; for moneylenders, it is the secrecy of the 
moneylending business. 
Credit extended by estate owners to their tenants and credit extended by 
employers to their employees tend to compete with similar credit extended by 
formal and semi-formal financial institutions. Mobilization of financial savings 
by SCAs also tends to compete with financial-savings mobilization by formal 
and semi-formal financial institutions. Otherwise, the credit extended by the rest 
of the informal financial institutions seems to complement credit from formal 
and informal financial sector. Whatever the case, the activities of the informal 
financial sector serve as means of involving the masses in economic 
development (USAID, 1989). But despite its success, the informal financial 
sector does not meet all the demand for loans, as explained above. Besides, few 
informal financial institutions provide term finance or generate resources for the 
future security of participants. These limitations of the informal financial sector 
can be addressed by measures that would (i) make more funds available to them, 
(ii) stimulate them to lend long-term, and (iii) encourage them to maximize 
long-term capital growth by persuasion but not through official regulation 
because that would be inimical to their informal mode of operation and hence 
their existence. 
One approach to this problem may be to establish and strengthen links 
between formal and informal financial markets. According to one authority, 
informal financial markets must be developed and integrated with formal 
financial markets so that (i) the savings in other sectors can be lent in the more 
productive agricultural sector, (ii) the informal financial market can share in the 
available amount of safe deficit financing through the development by the 
central bank of appropriate commercial and financial instruments, (iii) there can 
be a better allocation of financial resources between export and domestic crops 
and between commodities in strong demand and those in weak demand, and (iv) 
lenders in the informal markets can begin to adopt some of the practices of the 
formal financial market, such as accepting deposits and raising additional capital 
outside the family enterprise (U Tun Wai, 1981). We may add that the formal 
financial market could also benefit from the informal financial market's intimate 
knowledge of its borrowers and the techniques of dealing with them. Other 
writers are less enthusiastic. To the extent that formal and informal financial 
markets in developing countries serve the interests of different types of clientele, 
integration of the two may not benefit the weaker sector of the economy, a 
sector for which the formal market has not shown much concern (Bouman, 
1977). 
As to the mechanics of integration, it has been suggested that formal financial 
institutions should operate in rural areas (Ghatak, 1981). Whether this would be 
tantamount to integration is debatable. Formal and informal financial markets 
are already operating in both rural and urban areas. What may be required is to 
get each market to be associated with the activities of the other and to adopt 
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appropriate techniques from the other. Informal financial institutions could 
deposit surplus funds with formal financial institutions and meet their 
requirements of extra resources through borrowing from the formal market. In 
addition, the possibility of using informal financial institutions as agents of 
formal financial institutions should be explored. Future research might throw 
light on all these possibilities by focusing on links between the formal and 
informal financial sectors. 
Although the best solution is to maintain the informal financial sector and to 
improve on its performance, it may be worthwhile to expand and improve the 
semi-formal financial sector as a second-best solution. As has already been 
pointed out above, Malawi's semi-formal financial sector consists of an 
agricultural group lending scheme, co-operative finance institutions, a Grameen- 
type grassroots bank (World Bank, 1989) and two small development finance 
companies. The organization and operational characteristics of these institutions 
could benefit by drawing on the rich cultural heritage of the informal economy. 
At present, it is only a few of the cultural traits of the informal economy that 
have been adopted. 
The group lending scheme for smaliholder farmers is based on limited 
liability. Borrowers are required to put part of their loans in a fund that is 
forfeited if any member defaults. If all members repay their loans, these deposits 
are returned. This requirement has resulted in a good loan recovery record. 
Between 1969 and 1985, for example, 97 percent of the seasonal credit 
disbursed was recovered. During this period, 10 percent of the loans was held as 
security (World Bank, 1989). It must be noted that, in addition to the above 
requirement, continued access to credit was linked to prompt repayment of 
loans. The group lending scheme has improved access to credit. However, the 
beneficiaries are only 23 percent of all smaliholder farmers. The total sum 
disbursed annually is comparatively small. During the 1984/85 season it 
amounted to K 15.9 million. The high cost of administering the scheme, and the 
amount of resources available to it, limit its coverage. Another drawback is 
reliance on external resources which does not promote local savings habits and 
the mechanism for mobilizing those savings. 
Turning to co-operative finance, the first credit unions in Malawi were 
formed in the 1960s through initiative of Catholic missionaries. Following the 
establishment of the Malawi Union of Savings and Credit Cooperatives 
(MUSCCO) in 1980, the promotion of credit unions has become its 
responsibility. When MUSCCO was formed, there were 26 credit unions in the 
country with a membership of 7,700. Total savings stood at K400,000, while 
total loans outstanding were K300,000. By the end of 1985, there were 58 credit 
unions with a total membership of 14,500. At that time, total loans outstanding 
were K989,757 and reserves and total assets were K1,095,571 (Malawi/USAID, 
1987). Since then, reserves and total assets have grown to about K3 million. But 
even then, credit union movement is very small compared to informal financial 
markets. 
Being semi-formal institutions, credit unions suffer from most of the controls, 
inflexibility, repression and high administrative costs that formal financial 
institutions suffer from. In particular, credit unions do not permit withdrawal of 
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shares, making investment in them illiquid. And because of high loan 
deliquency rates, some credit unions cannot pay the dividends due to lack of 
interest income, making investment in them unprofitable. Even if they were able 
to pay dividends, the dividend rate of 10.75 percent (formerly 5 percent) 
compares unfavourably with the dividend rates of SCAs, even if one were to 
take into account the payment of bonuses. Furthermore, MUSCCO relies on 
foreign aid to meet its development and administrative costs, something that is 
not consistent with self-reliant economic financial development. 
The Grameen experiment follows the recent establishment of a grassroots 
banking institution, known as the Malawi Mudzi Fund, to serve the credit needs 
of the rural poor who certainly do not have access to formal and semi-formal 
financial institutions and probably do not have access to informal financial 
institutions either. Modelled on the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, the bank's 
customers will be organized into small groups. The bank will mobilize resources 
through small but regular deposits from its customers. The first borrowers in 
each group will be required to make several regular payments on their loans 
before other group members can borrow. The Malawi Mudzi Fund has started 
operating. An interest rate of 10.75 percent per annum will be paid on deposits 
and 15 percent per annum will be charged on loans. These interest rates are 
administered. No collateral security is required. 
The Malawi Mudzi Fund will suffer from the same disadvantages as the credit 
unions, but unlike the informal financial sector, the Fund may provide the 
mechanism for long-term capital growth and hence for the future financial 
security of its participants. 
The two small development finance companies concentrate on providing 
finance to small-scale and medium-scale businesses owned by Malawians. One 
is the Investment and Development Fund (Indefund), which was established in 
1981 as an offshoot of Indebank. The other is the Smaliscale Enterprise 
Development Organisation of Malawi (Sedom) which started operating in 1983 
with assistance from the EEC. Neither of these institutions mobilize resources. 
Instead, they rely on foreign aid, thus increasing external dependence. 
Moreover, the proportion of small- and medium-scale enterprises making use of 
their services is relatively small. In 1986, this proportion was estimated at 5 
percent. Credit access is limited by both availability of loanable funds and lack 
of resources to administer an extensive credit network. Besides limited 
coverage, these institutions suffer from controls, inflexibility, and high 
administrative costs. 
Annex 1 
Formal models of SCAs, CSAs and community funds 
Savings and credit associations can be explained by means of a formal model that has the 
following features: m which stands for the total number of members; p which stands for the 
contribution of each member per time period; c for the total number of contributions for the 
lifetime of each fund; P for the principal sum invested; i for the rate of interest charged on 
loans; A for the accumulated fund; E for earnings; e for the dividend rate; and t for the sum 
received per member at the end of the time period of the fund. 
The total number of people in each savings and credit association depends on demographic 
and other exogenous factors. Therefore, m is a predetermined variable. Other predetermined 
variables are p, c and i, where p depends on the ability and goal of the association, and where 
both c and i depend on the goal of the individual savings and credit association. A, P, E, e and 
t are endogenous variables. 
Given the above notation, the model can be put down as 
(1) A=P+E 
That is, the accumulated fund is the sum of the principal sum that is invested and earnings by 
definition. 
(2) P = P(m, p, c, i) 
is the function that relates P to its arguments, subject to dp/dm > 0, dp/dp > 0, dpldc > 0 and 
dpidi > 0. In other words, the principal sum invested varies directly with the size of the mem- 
bership, the size of the contribution per head per period, the length of the fund and the rate of 





where the bars over m, p, c and i indicate that these variables are determined exogenously, 
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(7) E = E(P, c, i) 
subject to dEfdP > 0, dEl dc > 0 and dE/di > 0. In other words, the total amount earned is a 
function of and varies directly with the sum of money invested, the duration of the fund and 
the rate of interest. 
(8) e = e (E, P) de/dE >0, de/dp <0 
That is, the dividend rate is a function of and varies directly with earnings and inversely with 
the principal sum invested. 
(9) t=t(A,m) dt/dA>0,dtJdm<0 
Equation (9) states that the sum received per member depends on and varies directly with the 
accumulated fund and inversely with the number of members. Lastly, the following condi- 
tions must hold: 
(10) i=1 m 
The sum of receipts must equal the accumulated fund (Chipeta, 1990). 
Co-operative savings behaviour can also be explained by means of a formal model. To 
simplify the analysis, it will be assumed that there are only two members in a CSA, 1 and 2. 
The total number of members, m, is thus equal to 2. Let yci and yc2 stand for the contribu- 
tions of 1 and 2, respectively. Similarly, let yoi and yo2 stand for the own incomes of 1 and 2; 
and ydi and yd2 stand for the disposable incomes of 1 and 2. Lastly, let c = 1, 2 stand for the 
time period that it takes to complete each contribution cycle. 
The total number of people in each CSA depends on friendship and other personal features. 
Therefore, m is a predetermined variable. Other predetermined variables are yci and yc2, 
which depend on the goals and abilities of the members; and yoi and yo2 which depend on 
conditions in the markets where the members sell their services and products. ydi and yd2 are 




c indicating that m and c are given. 
By definition 
(3) ycl=yc2 
Assuming that I receives and 2 contributes first in the cycle, 
(4) ydl=yol+yc2 
That is, the disposable income of 1 is the sum of own income and the contribution from 2. 
(5) yol=yol 
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(6) yc2=yc2 
That is, both yoi and yc2 are given. 
Without the transfer, the disposable income of 1 would be equal to yoi, own income, only. 
With the transfer, l's disposable income exceeds own income by the sum of yc2. The ratio of 
ydi to yoi, say a (where a = ydi/yol > 1) is the income amplifier. For the contributor, 2: 
(7) yd2=yo2-yc2 
(8) yo2=yo2 
Disposable income of 2, yd2 is less than own income yo2 by the amount of the transfer yc2. 
yc2 can be rewritten as: 
(9) yc2=byo2 




Community funds can be explained by means of a formal model that has the following fea- 
tures: m which stands for the total number of members; p which stands for the contribution of 
each member; P for the capital fund; i for the rate of interest charged on loans; A for the ac- 
cumulated fund; E for earnings; and T for the total sum distributed to needy members. 
The total number of people in each community fund depends on demographic factors. 
Therefore m is an exogenous variable. Other exogenous variables are p and i, where p de- 
pends on the ability and goal of the community fund and i depends on the needs of the mem- 
bership. P, A, E and T are endogenous variables. 
Given the above notation, the model can be put down as: 
(1) A=P+E 
By definition the accumulated fund is the sum of the capital fund and earnings. 
(2) P = P(m, p, i) dp/dm> 0, dp/dp >0, dp/di > 0 
Equation (2) states that the capital fund depends on and varies directly with the number of 




where the bars over m, p and i indicate that these variables are determined exogenously. 
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(6) E = E(p, i) dE/dp >0, dp/di >0 
In other words, total earnings depend upon and vary directly with the size of the capital fund 
(principal sum) and with the rate of interest. 
(7) T = T(A, in) dT/dA > 0, dT/dm <0 
That is, the total sum distributed to needy members depends on and varies directly with the 
accumulated fund and inversely with the number of members. Lastly, the following condition 
must hold: 
(8) 
That is, the total sum distributed must not exceed the accumulated fund. 
Assuming that transfers to needy members are made out of work earnings only, we have 
(2') P=P(Q) dP/dQ>0 
implying that the capital fund depends on Q, the work output of the members with which it 
varies directly. The work output is determined exogenously by the needs of the employer. So 
(9) Q=Q 
Further assuming that transfers to needy members are made out of work earnings only, we 
have 
(7') T=T(P,m) dT/dP>0, dT/dm<0 
subject to the proviso that the total amount distributed varies directly with the capital fund but 
inversely with the number of members. Equation (8) changes to 
(8') 
Next, assuming that the accumulated fund is used to benefit the community as a whole, the 
benefit accruing to the ith individual can be put down as 
n 
where the bar over bi is supposed to indicate that the benefit is based on individual i's relative 
needs. The entire accumulated fund may or may not be fully used up. Hence 
(11) i=l n 
If it is the earnings of the members that are used to benefit the entire community, condition 
(11) becomes 
i=l n 
In the event that the capital fund depends on both financial contributions and the work out- 
put of the members equation (2) can be put down as 
(2') P=P(Q,m,p,i) 
subject to dPIdQ > 0, dP/dm > 0 and dPidi > 0 
(Chipeta, 1990). 
Annex 2 
Questionnaire: Informal financial markets 
Case number LI 
Name of supervisor 
Name of Enumerator 
Date of Interview 
Whether checked by Supervisor 
Village or Town 




Not coded [II] 
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Informal financial markets 
Questionnaire 
A. Personal details 
1. What is your 
2. Gender? 01 - Male 02 - Female 
3. Age in years 01 - (20—29) 02 - (30—39) 03 - (40—49) 
04 - (50—59) 05 - (60 and over) 
4. What is your religion? 
01 - Christianity 02 - Islam 03 - Hindu 04 - Other 
5. Which is your home district 
6. Where do you live now7 
7. How many kilometres from home village? 01 less than 8 km 02—5—10 km 
03 —11—20 km 04—more than 20 km 
8. Are you single or married? 
01 Single 02— Married 
9. How many dependants do you have? State number 
01 — Wives 03 Other dependants 
02 Children 04— Total number of dependants 
10. Did you go to school? 01 — Yes 02— No 
11. Up to what level? 
01 Primary 02— Secondary 03— Tertiary 
12. Can you read and write? 01 — Yes 02— No 
13. Are you employed? 01 — Yes 02 — No 
14. What is your occupation? State 
15. Are you self employed? 01 — Yes 02— No 
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16. What is your business 
01 —Trading 
02 — Grain milling 
03 — Smaliscale farming 
04 Estate farming 
05 — Manufacturing 
06— Brickmaking 
13 — Vendor 
15 — Other (specify) 
17. How much money did you earn? 
01—1987K... 02—1988K... 
07 Constructing houses 
08— Exporting 
09— Importing 
10 — Owner of hotel, resthouses, 
restaurant, bar. 
11 Transporting 
12— Repairing and other services 
14— Tenant 
03 — Last (or any latest) month K... 
18. How much did you save last (or any latest) month in any of the following: 
01 — Post Office K... 05 — Leasing & Finance Co. K... 
02 — New Building Society K... 06— Mercantile Credit K... 
03 A commercial bank K... 07 — Other (specify) K... 
(National or Commercial Bank) 
04 — Credit union K... 
20. When you went to obtain your most recent or only loan, how much did you spend on 
transport? K... 
20 (a) When you went to obtain your most recent loan, how much did you spend on rest- 
house/hotel? K... 
20 (b) When you went to obtain your most recent loan, how much did you spend on appli- 
cations fees, other fees, etc? K. 
20 (c) If you received some of your income in kind last (or any latest) month, what was it and 
what was its value? 
K 
B. Savings and credit associations (SCAs) (Borrowing funds) 
21. DoyoutakepartinSCA? 
01 —Yes 02— No 
19. How much did you borrow recently from these institutions 
01 — New Building Society K... 06— Sedom K... 
02— A commercial bank K... 07— Indefund K... 
03 — Leasing & Finance K... 08 — Agricultural Fund K... 
04 — Mercantile Credit K... 09 — Your employers K... 
05 — Credit Union 10— Other (specify) 
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22. What are the monthly expenses of the association? K... 
23. How many are you? 
24. When was your SCA formed9 
25. Why did you form the SCA? 
01 — To save 04 —To have source of loans 
02 To make money for travel during holiday 05 — Other (specify) 
03 — To make money for various 
purposes 
26 (a) How much did you contribute per head at beginning of the year? 
01—1986/7K... 03—1988/9K... 
02— 1986/7 K... 
26 (b) If you contributed per month, how much was it per head K... 
27. How much did you get back (deposit plus interest)? 
At the end of: 01—1986/7K... 03—1988/9K... 
02—1987/8K... 
28. Did you borrow from the fund? 
01—Yes 02—No 
29. How much did you borrow during the year? 
01—198617K... 03—1988/9K... 
02—1987/8K... 
30. In the act of last borrowing in 1988/89, how much did you spend on transport? K... 
31. In the act of last borrowing in 1988/89, how much did you spend on a resthouse/hotel? 
K... 
32. In the act of last borrowing in 1988/89, how much did you spend on application fees, 
other fees, etc? K. 
33. How much did you pay back (principal plus interest) during the year? 
01—198617K... 03—1988/9K... 
02—1987/8K... 
34. If you did not pay back on time how many months did it take you to pay? 
35. What did you use the borrowed money for in 1988/89? State amount. 
01 —Food 08 —Farm labour 
02 — Other non-durable consumables 09 — Business Capital 
04 — School fees/uniform 10— General support of relatives at 
home village 
05 — Transport 11 — Lending 
06 — Other services 12 Loan repayment 
07 Fertilizer 13 — Other (specify) 
46 RESEARCH PAPER 4 
36. What did you use the money distributed in 1988/89 for? State amount. 
01 — Food 08 — Farm labour 
02 — Other non-durable consumable 09 — Business Capital 
03 — Durable consumables 10— General support of relatives at 
home village 
04 — School fees/uniform 11 — Lending 
05 — Transport 12— Loan repayment 
06 — Other services 13 — Other (specify) 
07 — Fertilizer 
37. Was it enough? 
01—Yes 02—No 
38. If not, did you get money from other sources? 
01—Yes 02—No 
39. What sources were they? 
01 —Salary 06—Friends 
02 — Business 07 — Relatives 
03 — Farming 08 — Neighbours 
04— Katapila 09—Landlord 
05 — Traders 10— Employers 
11 — Other (specify) 
40. How much did you get from them? K... 
41. Where did the money you coniributed to the SCA in 198 8/89 come from? 
01 — Salary 03 —Farming 
02 — Business 04 — Other (specify) 
42. Did you go to your home village during your long annual holiday? 
01—Yes 02—No 
43. Do you bank your personal money? 
01—Yes 02—No 
44. If so, where? 
01 — Post Office 05 — Merchantile Credit 
02— A commercial bank 06— CSA 
03 New Building Society 07 — At home in notes and coin 
04 — Leasing and Finance 08 — Other (specify) 
45. Do you bank because of 
01 — Safety 03 — Other (specify) 
46. If you do not bank, is it because 
01 — Banking facilities are far away 04 — Low interest rates at banks 
02 — Not aware of levels of interest rates at banks 05 — Don't trust banks 
03 — Not aware of safety and other benefits at banks 06 — Low income 
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47. Does your SCA bank its money? 
01—Yes 02—No 
48. If not, is it because 
01 Interest rates in banks are lower than in 02 — Other (specify) 
your SCA 
49. Does your SCA borrow from banks? 
01—Yes 02—No 
50. How are you related to other members of the SCA? 
01 Workmates 05 — Neighbours 
02 — Businessmates 06 — Former schoolmates 
03 — Friends 07 — Other (specify) 
04—Relatives 
51. WhorunstheSCA? 
01 — Committee 03 — All together 
02—Leader 04— Nobody 
Note: Interviewer should enquire from treasurer and/or other officials of an 
SCA about their operational procedures, rules, nature of records kept, 
etc and make brief notes. 
52. If your SCA banks money, where does it bank? 
01 — Post Office 05 — Merchantile Credit 
02—A commercial bank 06— CSA 
03 New Building Society 07 — At home 
04 Leasing and Finance Co. 08 — Other (specify) 
53. What is the rate of interest on SCA loans7 % 
C. Chilimba or Chiperegani or Chiryelano (CSAs) 
21. Do you take part in Chilimba? 
01—Yes 02—No 
22. What are your monthly expenses? K... 
23. How many are you? 
24. How are you related to other members? 
01 — Workmates 05 — Neighbours 
02 — Businessmates 06 — Former schoolmates 
03 — Friends 07 — Other (specify) 
04 — Relatives 
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25. Why did you form the Chilimba? 
01 — To raise funds 
02 — To force ourselves to save 
03 — Other (specify) 
26. How much do you contribute per head per period? K... 
27. What is the period? 
01 —Weekly 
02 — Bi-weekly 
03 — Monthly 
28. When did you last obtain your share in the pool?... 
04— Yearly 
05 — Other (specify) 
29. What did you use the money for? Indicate the amount? 
01 —Food 
02 — Other non-durable consumables 
03 — Durable consumables 
04 — Transport 
05 Other services 
06— School fees/uniform 
07 — Farm labour 
08 — Fertilizer 
09 — General support of relatives at 
home village 
10—Lending 
11 — Loan repayment 
12—Saved 
13 —Other (specify) 
30. Was the money from the Chilimba enough for the purpose? 
01—Yes 
31. If not, did you get money from other sources? 
01 —Yes 
32. What were they? 
02—No 
02—No 
07 — Estate owner 
08 — Traders 
09-SCA 
10 — Katapila 
11 — Employers 
12 — Other (specify) 
33. Where does the money that you contribute to Chilimba come from? 
01 — Salary 07—Estate owner 
02 — Business 08 — Traders 
03 — Farming 
04—Friends 
05 — Relatives 
06 — Neighbours 
01 —Salary 
02 — Business 
03 — Farming 
04—Friends 





12 — Other (specify) 
FINANCIAL SECTOR AND MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT 49 
34. When did you start the Chilimba'1 
35. How did you decide who should get the pool of money first? 
01 — Drew lots 03 By negotiation 
02 Seniority 04 — Other (specify) 
36. Who runs the Chilimba? 
01 Committee 
02 Leader 
37. Do you deposit money from Chilimba in banks? 
01 —Yes 
38. Which banks? 
01 Post Office 
02 — New Building Society 
03 A commercial bank 
39. Do you bank your personal money? 
01—Yes 
40. If yes, where? 
01 Post Office 
02— A commercial bank 
03 — New Building Society 
04 — Leasing and Finance Co. 
41. Do you bank because of: 
01 —Safety 
02 — Interest income 
03 — All together 
04— Nobody 
02— No 
04 — Leasing and Finance 
05 Merchantile Credit 
06— Other (specify) 
02— No 
05 — Merchantile Credit 
06-SCA 
07 At home in notes and coin 
08 — Other (specify) 
03 Other (specify) 
42. If you do not bank, is it because: 
01 Banking facilities are far away 04 — Low interest rates at banks 
02 — Not aware of levels of interest rates at banks 05 Don't trust banks 
03 — Not aware of safety and other benefits at banks 06—Low income 
07 Other (specify) 
Note: Interviewer should enquire from treasurer and other officials of SCA 
about their operational procedures, rules, nature of records kept, etc and 
make brief notes. 
D. Kafapila 
21. When did you start lending money under Katapila? 
Year of 
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22. How much did you lend during 
02 — Last (or any latest) month K... 
23. How much were you paid on loans extended during 
01 — 1988 K... 
01 —Year 1988K... 
02— Last (or any latest) month K... 
24. What action did you take on unrepaid loans last (or any latest) month? 
01 — Summoned defaulter(s) to court 05 — Seized defaulter(s) property 
02 — Summoned defaulter(s) to party officials 06 — No action 
03 — Stopped lending him (them) 07 — Other (specify) 
04— Rescheduled the loan(s) 
25. What was the time period of the loan(s) extended last (or any latest) month? 
01 — One year 03 — Other (specify) 
02 — One month 
26. How much did you charge on each kwacha? 
27. What was the security? 
01 — Mboni (Kaboni) 
02 — Tax receipts 
03 — Signature 
04— Cheque 
05 — Property 
06—Other (specify) 
28. Where did you obtain the money that you lent last (or any latest) month from? 
01 — Salary 03 — Business 
02 — Farming 04 — Other (specify) 
29. If some of the money was borrowed, how much was it? K... 
30. Where did you borrow it from? 
01 — A commercial bank 
02—Sedom 
03 — Indefund 
04 — Katapila 




09 Smallscale farmer 
10— Estate owner 
11— Other (specify) 
31. Did you meet all the demand for loans last (or any latest) month? 
01—Yes 
32. If no, what was the shortfall? K... 
02— No 
33. How much of your annual cash income comes from Katapila? 
All.... More than half... Half... Less than half. . 
34. How much of your time do you devote to Katapila? 
All. ... More than half.... Half. . Less than half. . . 
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35. How much did you save from Katapila last (or any latest) month? K.. 
36. If so, where? 
01 A Commercial Bank 02— Post office 
03 New Building Society 04— CSA 
05—SCA 06—Athome 
07 Other (specify) 
37. Do you keep records of the loans you extend and their recoveries? 
01—Yes 02—No 
38. How many days per month do you spend on lending money? 
39. How many days per month do you spend on collecting repayments? 
E. Other Lenders (e.g. landlords, traders, friends, relatives, employers, 
neighbours) 
21. Type of lender 
01 — Katapila 06 — Friend 
02 — Estate owner 07 Relative 
03 Trader 08 — Neighbour 
04— Smallholder farmer 09—Employer 
05 — Grain miller 10 — Other (specify) 
22. What are your monthly expenses? K. 
23. When did you start lending money? 
24. How much did you lend during: 
01 — Year 1988 K... 02 —Last (or any latest) month K 
25. What was the time period of the loan(s) extended last (or any latest) month? 
01 — One year 02 — One month 03 — Other (specify) 
26. What was the interest rate (state in tambales per one kwacha lent) 
27. What was the security 
01 — Mboni (Kaboni) 04 Cheque 
02 — Tax receipts 05 Property 
03 — Signature 06 — Other (specify) 
28. How much did you get out of loans extended during? 
01 — Year 1988 K... 02 — Last (or any latest) month K... 
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29. What action did you take on unrepaid loans last (or any latest) month? 
01 — Summoned defaulter(s) to court 05 — Seized defaulter(s) property 
02 — Summoned defaulter(s) to party officials 06 — No action 
03 — Stopped lending him (them) 07 — Other (specify) 
04 Rescheduled the loan(s) 
30. Where did you obtain the money that you loaned from? 
01 —Salaiy 
02— Farming 
03 — Trading 
04 — Grain milling 
05 — Other (specify) 
31. If some money was borrowed, how much was it? K 
32. Where did you borrow it from? 
01 — A commercial bank 
02—Sedom 
03 — Indefund 
04 — Katapila 
06-SCA 
07 — Friend 
08 — Neighbour 
09 — Smallscale farmer 
10— Estate owner 
11— Other (specify) 
33. Did you meet all the demand for loans last (or any latest) month? 
01—Yes 02—No 
34. If no, what was the shortfall? K. 
35. How much of your annual cash income comes from lending? 
All .... More than half... Half... Less than half. 
36. How much of your time is devoted to lending money? 
All.... More than half.... Half.... Less than half.. 
37. Is some income from lending saved? 
01—Yes 02—No 
38. If yes, where? 
01 — A commercial bank 
02— Post Office 
03 — New Building Society 
04 Merchantile Credit 
39. Do you keep records of the loans you extend and their recoveries? 
01—Yes 02— No 
40. How many days in a month do you spend on lending money? 
05 — Trader 
05 -CSA 
06 — At home in notes and coin 
07- SCA 
08 Other (specify) 
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41. Normally how many days in a month do you spend on recovering your loans? 
F. Borrowing 
21. Did you borrow money from any sources last month/year? 
01 —Yes 02—No 
22. What sources were they? 
01 —Katapila 
02 Estate owner 
03 — Traders 
04 Smallholder farmers 
06—Friends 
07 — Relatives 
08 Neighbours 




07 — Relatives 
08 Neighbours 
09 — Others (specify) 
10 — Employers 
24. To obtain your loan, how much did you spend on transport? 
K 
25. To obtain your loan, how much did you spend on a resthouse/hotel? K. 
26. To obtain your loan, how much did you spend on application fees, other fees, etc? K... 
27. How much was the interest for each loan? (state in tambalas per one Kwacha) 
01 Katapila 06—Friends 
02 Estate owner 07 Relatives 
03 — Traders 08 — Neighbours 
04 — Smallholder farmers 09 — Other (specify) 
05-SCA 
28. What security did you provide 
01 Mboni (Kaboni) 
02 — Tax receipts 
03 — Signature 
29. Did you repay principal plus interest on time? 
04— Cheque 
05 — Property 
06 — Other (specify) 
01—Yes 02—No 
05-SCA 
23. How much did you borrow from each source last (or any latest) month? 
01 — Katapila 
02 — Estate owner 
03 — Traders 
04 — Smaliholder farmers 
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30. How many months did it take you to repay the loan? 
months 
31. What was the time period of the loan? 
01 — 1 year 
02— 1 month 
32. If you did not repay on time, why not? 
01 — Lack of adequate funds 
33. What action was taken by lenders? 
01 — Summoned to court 
02 — Summoned to Party Officials 
03 — Stopped lending me 
04 — Rescheduled the loan 
34. What did you use the money borrowed on? 
01 -Food 
02 — Other non-durable consumables 
03 — Durable consumables 
04 — School fees/uniform 
home village 
05 — Transport 
06 — Other services 
35. Did you get all that you wanted from these sources? 
01—Yes 
03 — Indefinite 
04 — Others (specify) 
02 — Other (specify) 
05 — Seized my property 
06— No action 
07 — Other (specify) 
07 — Fertilizer 
08 — Farm labour 
09 — Business 
10— General support of relatives at 
11 — Lending 
12 — Loan repayment 
13 —Other (specify) 
02 — No 
36. If not, what was the shortfall? K 
37. For how long have you been borrowing from these sources7 
38. Why do you borrow from these but not other sources? 
01 — Interest lower 
02 — Have adequate funds 
03 — Known to me 
39. How did you know about these sources 
01 — Through other people 
02 — Advertised themselves 
04 — Easy to get loan 
05 — Loan given quickly 
06— Near home 
07 — Other (specify) 
03 — Personal knowledge 
04—Other (specify) 
40. What was the total sum borrowed in 1988? K 
41. How much was repaid? K 
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G. Group or Community fund 
21. Do you belong to a group or community fund? 
01—Yes 02—No 
22. How many are you? 
23. How is the money for the fund raised? 
01 — Financial contributions 03 Other (specify) 
02—Group work 
24. If the money is raised through financial contributions, how much does each member 
contribute? K 
25. Is the contribution 
01 — yearly 03 — weekly 
02 — monthly 04 — Other (specify) 
26. If the money is raised through work, what type of work is it? 
01 — agricultural 04 — harvesting 
02 — construction 05 — other (specify) 
03 — processing produce 
27. What is the money used for? 
01 — community projects 02 — private emergencies 
03 — both 01 and 02 04 — other (specify) 
28. Is the money lend out to individual members? 
01—Yes 02—No 
29. If yes, is it lent out at interest? 
01—Yes 02—No 
30. If it is lent out at interest, what is the rate of interest? % 
31. What is the required time period? 
01 — 1 month 04 — indefinite 
02 — 1 week 05 — Other (specify) 
03 1 year 
32. Did you borrow from the fund last (1988) year? 
01—Yes 02—No 
33. If yes, how much was it? K 
34. Did you return the whole sum? 
01—Yes 02—No 
35. If not, how much was not repaid? K 
Notes 
1. The term informal financial sector is taken from the term "informal sector" which was 
first used by Keith Hart in "Informal income opportunities and urban employment in 
Ghana", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. II, No. 1 (March 1973), pp. 61—89; and 
in International Labour Organisation and United Nations Development Programme, 
Employment, Incomes, and Equality. A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in 
Kenya (Geneva, 1972). Since then the term has been used widely. 
2. The authors are grateful to Prof. M.L. Srivastava of the Demographic Unit, Chancellor 
College, for his assistance in drawing up the sample for the main survey and for 
estimating the weights used in calculating a number of population parameters. 
3. This compares favourably with a sample of 1,376 selected in the 1980/8 1 National Sample 
Survey in Agriculture. 
4. Blantyre City, Mangochi Township, Zomba District, Mangochi District, Lilongwe 
District, Dowa District, Mponela Township, Mzimba Boma, Mzimba District, Mzuzu 
City, Rumphi Boma, Rumphi District, Nkhata Bay Boma and Nkhata Bay District. 
5. Brazil, Burma, Colombia, Cyprus, El Salvador, India, Japan, Jordan, Khmer Republic, 
Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand and Turkey. 
6. India, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Phillipines, South Viet Nam, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and 
Thailand in Asia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Equador and Mexico in Latin America; and 
Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey in the Middle East. 
7. After allowing for the period of credit, the size of the informal financial sector is estimated 
to be about the same as that of the other sector. See Tables 8 and 9. 
8. This may not be a serious weakness if it is assumed that outstanding informal-sector credit 
is small. 
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